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Abstract 
 
   
For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism in 
general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular.  Yet capital markets’ shape, 
support, and extent are often contested in the polity. Powerful elements — from politicians 
to mass popular movements — have reason to change, co-opt, and remove value from 
capital markets. And players in capital markets have reason to seek rules that favor their 
own capital channels over those of others. How these contests are settled deeply affects 
the form, the extent, and the effectiveness of capital markets. And investigation of the 
primary political economy forces shaping capital markets can point us to a more general 
aspect of economic, political, and legal institutions. Much important work has been done 
in recent decades on the vitality of institutions. Less well emphasized thus far is that 
widely-shared, deeply-held preferences, often arising from current interests and opinions, 
can at times sweep away prior institutions or, less dramatically but more often, sharply 
alter or replace them. When they do so, old institutions can be replaced by new ones, or 
strongly modified. Preferences can at crucial times trump institutions, and how the two 
interact is well-illustrated by the political economy of capital markets. 
                                                          
1 Professor, Harvard Law School 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism 
in general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular. Yet it’s not so 
obvious how and why political institutions come to support a deep, wide, well-
functioning capital market, because many interests have reason to undermine the 
capital market and because the immediate beneficiary of a strong capital market is 
a minority of wealthy capital-owners. The polity in a functioning democracy must 
come to see capital markets as benefiting the majority, despite the fact that the 
benefit is indirect and not always vivid. 
Here I outline the main weaknesses in the interaction between political 
institutions and capitalism, indicate the most common resolution of these 
weaknesses, and show how the interaction between capital markets and politics has 
been seen in the academic literature. 
Two core categories of problems afflict the interaction between politics and 
financial markets, both emanating from the fact that capitalism can generate large 
pools of financial assets whose disposition and use can be contested. The first is 
that the have-nots, eyeing those assets, may use the political arena to obtain a slice 
of those assets that they cannot obtain in the economic arena, thereby creating a 
pernicious contest between the haves and the have-nots, one that burns resources 
and that needs to be settled or accommodated. How that contest is resolved deeply 
affects both the shape and extent of the capital market. 
The second recurring problem is that the haves — typically the capital-
owners themselves, but not always, as managers without capital often have 
considerable political influence due to the control over assets that they do not 
themselves formally own — may fight among themselves for rights to those assets. 
While it is tempting to explain the survival of longstanding financial and corporate 
structures as resulting from rational optimization of private goals, they are often 
just as much reactions to conflicts among capital-owners, or mandates from the 
winners. I will give some examples in the United States of how conflicts among 
capitalists and their managers largely explain core features of the capital market for 
the large public firm in the United States. Other examples can be had from 
Western Europe. Private optimization explanations alone cannot do the job. 
Many of the real world’s interactions between politics and capitalism are 
variations of these two fundamental contests, between have and have-nots, and 
among the haves themselves. And a considerable portion of the academic world’s 
analysis of modern political economy involves variations of these two fundamental 
problems. 
                                                          
∗ Professor, Harvard Law School. 
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When we see weak capital markets in a nation, or when we ask why a 
nation’s capital market takes on a particular configuration, we tend to look to 
efficiency explanations for the result: the country doesn’t need securities markets 
for this or that reason; banks fit best with the production technology then 
prevailing in that economy; or the country never developed the institutions of 
investor protection. These are surely relevant to a full explanation. Less well-
highlighted, even today, are that political economy explanations are also core to 
any full explanation. Look to the dominant political interests and decision-makers 
in the society — if we do not see strong capital markets, it’s often because it’s not 
in the politically decisive players’ interest to allow them to be strong. If their 
interests change, the capital markets’ character can also change. 
This political explanation is especially likely to be in play in nations that 
have had little difficulty in building other resilient institutions: particularly for such 
nations, political support for capital markets is more likely to be a policy choice 
rather than an issue of institutional capabilities. 
Complications abound. Causation is bidirectional; several economic, 
institutional, and political features are determined simultaneously. Few political 
features are fully discrete. Most interact, with coalitions and multiple political 
forces in play. I sketch here the simple stories first, then show several of the 
interactions, complications, and causation reversals. 
*  *  * 
Financial markets can be seen as primarily a function of a nation’s 
governing institutions. Considerable progress has been made in economics since 
North (1990) demonstrated institutions’ importance. But institutions interact with 
preferences and, indeed, widespread deeply-held preferences (presumably 
emanating from immediate interests and, at times, overall ideologies) can bend, 
destroy, and build institutions. Here I give more emphasis than is typical to the role 
of preferences in constructing the institutions of financial markets.  
I divide the inquiry along two major dimensions. First, what is the political 
economy — the interaction between preferences and institutions — of capitalist 
finance for the nation’s haves versus the have-nots? And second, what is the 
political economy of capitalist finance that divides the nation’s haves? Subsidiary 
to each dimension, I ask how these questions play out in the world’s richer nations 
and how they play out in the world’s developing nations. Are there enough 
commonalities across nations, so that patterns can be discerned? 
I also show how this inquiry highlights the importance of attending to the 
interaction between institutions and preferences. The former has been central in 
scholarship of the past few decades. Institutions are indeed important — but so are 
preferences and interests, and these preferences and interests are not always shaped 
by their institutional environment. What seems sometimes obscured in the 
literature is that preferences, when sufficiently powerful, can wash institutions 
away as easily as shacks collapse in a hurricane. That does not happen often 
outside of severe crisis, but it does happen then. And preferences can then build the 
institutions that can withstand (some of) the future’s fickleness. Today’s 
institutions developed out of the preferences that dominated in the past. And 
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tomorrow’s institutions may well be as much a function of today’s preferences as 
they are of today’s institutions. 
 
I. CONCEPT 
 
A. Capital Markets’ Dependence on Political Institutions 
 
If a nation’s polity does not support a capital market, that nation will not 
have strong capital markets. Examine whether strong capital markets are in the 
interest of the decisive political actors — or what shape of capital markets best 
implements their interests — and one is likely to have a primary explanation for 
the shape and extent of the nation’s capital market. The concept is simple, but 
powerful. 
 
B. The Interests that Support, or Denigrate, Capital Markets 
 
Capital owners typically have an interest in promoting capital markets and 
their supporting institutions, but other interests may not. Local interests may 
oppose centralized financial institutions that move capital. Those with strong 
human capital could fear that strong capital markets would erode that human 
capital’s value, by forcing more market-oriented change more quickly. Those 
without financial capital today and with poor prospects of acquiring capital in the 
future could prefer that the polity take capital from those who have it and use it to 
benefit those who do not. 
Capital is often unevenly distributed in a nation, facilitating conflict between 
haves and have-nots. Even when income and property are roughly evenly 
distributed, economic rationality demands aggregation institutions, like banks and 
securities markets, to achieve operational economies of scale. These aggregations 
can become vivid in the polity and attract negative attention. 
Capital markets are not generic. Banks have an interest in preserving bank 
financing channels and in weakening securities market channels. Securities dealers 
and investment bankers have an interest in preserving and expanding securities 
markets. Dominant owners, such as families traditionally or private equity firms 
more recently have interests in preserving their privileges. Owners of existing 
firms want access to cheap capital, but prefer that their competitors not have the 
same easy access. 
Government bureaucracies can be wary of rival power centers in capital 
markets or, sometimes, wish to promote them as counter-weights to other power 
centers in their society. 
  
II.  CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPED 
WORLD 
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Two basic political cleavages organize the inquiry here for developed 
nations: one, the contest between those who have capital and those who do not, 
and, two, contests among the owners of capital. 
 
A. Haves vs. Have-Nots 
 
1. Governmental power vs. private power. The most basic political economy 
have vs. have-not conflict is between governmental authorities and private sector 
players who command capital. While not usually seen as a conflict between haves 
and have-nots, it is indeed such a conflict — as government often seeks to obtain 
for itself capital that it lacks or to command its private sector use. In extreme form, 
a non-democratic, dictatorial government could prefer to directly allocate capital 
itself, stifling the development of a private sector in general, and capital markets in 
particular, as such markets can become rival power centers in the nation. 
Governmental authorities can build, shape, or destroy capital markets, for 
their own reasons and not as tools of other interests or ideologies. The 
governmental authorities may wish to denigrate a rival power center, one that 
could seek to control the government. Governmental authorities could be 
susceptible to ideologies and beliefs that capital markets will not produce social 
welfare and that government needs to direct and control capital flows to better 
produce wealth or justice. Finally, governmental authorities may see government 
action as the vanguard of economic and social development; in pursuing policies to 
implement their goals, they can crowd out private capital markets and thereby 
prevent them from developing nicely. 
More standard accounts, which I shall address below, examine how interests 
can capture government decisionmaking and use captured governmental 
institutions for the interests’ own ends. But the concept differs in this section. 
Government authorities are themselves an interest, with their own interests and 
ideology separate from those in the civil, nongovernmental society. Their own 
direct interests and beliefs can motivate their actions vis-à-vis capital markets. See 
Douglas (1940: 11, 14) (statement from chair of SEC: people who dominate 
financial markets have “tremendous power…. Such [people] become virtual 
governments in the power at their disposal. [Sometimes it is] the dut[y] of 
government to police them, at times to break them up … .”); cf. Skocpol (1979). 
2. Populism vs. power. Populism can affect financial markets and 
institutions, often in reaction to financial crises and poor economic results. Popular 
opinion may seek as much to punish financiers and their institutions as to improve 
the financial system’s functioning, as the two — punishment and improvement — 
could be conflated in the popular mind. When this feature is powerful in politics, it 
can induce an institutionalization of anti-capital rules and reaction. Then, once 
institutionalized, interests arise with reason to perpetuate the underlying rules and 
the resultant arrangements. Thus, even when the popular animus against finance 
dissipates in more normal political times, the created interests can stymie a return 
to the previous arrangements. 
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3. Business elites vs. masses. Workers could dislike capital and capital 
markets. Farmers may blame financial markets for their misfortunes as much as 
bad weather. Each group may have simple redistributional goals, or their thinking 
and voting may be influenced by envy. 
4. Social democracy vs. capital markets. Social democracy played a central 
role in how capital markets developed in post–World War II Western Europe. By 
social democracy I mean a nation committed to private property, but where 
distributional considerations are vital, where labor is typically powerful, and where 
government action to foster economic equality is central on the political agenda.  
For diffuse stock markets to persist, the diffuse capital-owners must see 
their firms as managed by agents who are sufficiently loyal to shareholders to 
provide shareholder value. For dominant shareholders to turn their firm over to 
ownership in liquid stock markets and, hence, to managerial control, they must 
expect that the net value of the turnover is beneficial. If the benefits of liquidity 
and professional management are offset by managerial disloyalty, fewer dominant 
stockholders will turn their firms over to managers than otherwise. For 
shareholders to count on this managerial loyalty, they need institutions and norms 
that induce that kind of loyalty. But if a polity will not provide those institutions, 
or if it denigrates such norms, more shareholder value can be obtained by dominant 
stockholders keeping control of the firm. Managerial control will not ordinarily 
appear and will be unstable if it does. Stock markets will not be strong in such 
nations, because managerial agency costs will be too high and too hard to get to 
acceptable levels. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between labor power (quantified by 
union and job security rules) and the degree to which large firms have large 
blockholders. Greater labor power is associated with greater ownership 
concentration; weaker labor power is associated with more diffuse ownership. 
Details, sources, and background to the graphic can be found in Roe (2000, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visible incentive compensation that ties managers to owners may be 
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resulting wealth disparity could especially demoralize lower-level employees and 
lead them to demand further compensation for themselves. And, as noted above, 
governmental players can be less willing to provide capital-market-supporting 
institutions, such as disclosure rules and enforcement, insider trading sanctions, 
and commercial courts, as the authorities may see these difficulties as disputes 
among the well-to-do — disputes that the public authorities need not attend to. 
These costs to controlling managerial agency costs can be particularly severe in 
social democratic polities. 
A considerable literature has developed on the primacy of institutions in 
property rights protection, which has obvious relevance to protection of capital 
market investors. While institutions are surely important, the possibility exists that 
the academic literature is over-sold on institutions now, while under-estimating 
simple, basic political power. Politicians can mold institutions. Even in the United 
States, where property rights institutions are typically seen as being as strong as 
they can be, a Congress that wanted to attack capital markets could do so and do so 
effectively.  
What may well count as much as institutions for the United States is that 
there is no political will for a frontal assault on American capital markets. And, 
indeed, recent evidence indicates that right-leaning governments are perceived by 
property owners to protect their property better than left-leaning ones and that this 
partisanship dimension dominates institutional characteristics in explaining the 
degree of perceived property protection.2
*  *  * 
  
Those then are the major have vs. have-not breaks affecting capital markets 
in developed nations. Clearly they overlap and can combine. 
 
B. Haves vs. Haves 
 
Vertical conflict — between the capital markets’ haves and the have-nots — 
is not the only political economy array here. There’s a horizontal dimension as 
well, of conflict among the haves, one that comes in three major varieties: conflicts 
between capital owners, conflicts between large firm managers and capital 
markets, and conflicts between controlling shareholders and capital markets. 
1. Capital markets’ internal fissures, especially that of banks vs. stock 
market capitalism. If securities markets are weak, more capital will flow through 
the banking system. Deposit banks have an interest in keeping securities markets 
weak, unless they can control securities flows themselves. The interests seek to 
protect themselves using the political realm. Macey & Miller (1991) showed that 
in the United States deposit banks often lobbied for blue sky laws that raised the 
costs of stock sales.  
Small banks have an interest in stifling competition from big banks. In the 
United States, this historically took the primary form of small banks inducing 
political decision-makers to bar the large, money-center banks from entering the 
                                                          
2 Weymouth & Broz (2008). 
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small banks’ local market. The result was that the small banks had local 
monopolies or oligopolies, while large banks lacked a nation-wide deposit base. 
Roe (1994) emphasizes this feature of nineteenth century (and most of the 
twentieth century) American financial history, particularly when the power of local 
bankers combined with populist opinion that militated against large, centralized 
financial institutions. With even the largest banks relatively small in relation to the 
economy, banks could not readily provide the financing for continent-spanning 
industries at the end of the nineteenth century. The consequence was that the 
demand and need for securities markets was enhanced.  
Intra-capital-market tactical conflict can have unexpected, but profound, 
outcomes, as Langevoort (1987) shows. During the 1933 banking crisis, larger 
money center banks sought to dissuade Congress from enacting deposit insurance, 
because they thought they would end up paying disproportionately for the 
insurance and, without the insurance, deposits would run off from smaller, country 
banks to the larger, more stable money center banks. (Yes, there was a time when 
such large, money center banks were seen as the most stable in the American 
economy.) Because they knew that Congress would insist on doing something, 
they suggested and supported splitting investment from commercial banking (as 
they were not making much money in the securities business anyway). By so 
suggesting, they hoped to dissuade Congress from mandating deposit insurance. 
Congress did sever investment from commercial banking via the famous Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, as the large banks suggested. But Congress also decided 
nevertheless to insure banks deposits, which the large money center banks had 
opposed. 
2. Managers vs. capital markets. Managers of large diffusely-owned firms 
have reason to disrupt their shareholders’ capacity to aggregate their stock 
ownership. Although they do not necessarily own capital themselves, they control 
it and they seek to maintain their control over capital. They seek laws that impede 
or bar hostile takeovers. They seek rules that make it costly for shareholders to 
take large, active positions. They seek proxy contest rules that make it hard for 
shareholders to elect directors other than those that incumbent managers support. 
(Corporate election contests are costly. Stockholder votes need to be solicited, 
corporate election contest rules have to be complied with, and publicity needs to be 
sought. The firm pays for the incumbents’ nominees, but insurgents generally pay 
their own costs, although any gains they bring about accrue to all shareholders. 
Free rider problems abound, deterring otherwise valuable contests.) These conflicts 
could be characterized alternatively as politically powerful haves (the managers) 
moving value into their hands and away from economically well-to-do haves 
(capital owners) who are less politically powerful. 
These managerial efforts have been significant in the United States 
historically and continue to be central even today. Managers have successfully 
opposed proposals in this past decade to allow shareholders easy access to the 
firm’s proxy statement, which would allow dissidents to more easily elect 
directors, although the issue remains on the SEC’s agenda. Prior outbreaks of the 
shareholder access proposal in the United States, starting in the 1940s, also died 
after managers successfully opposed the proposals. There’s a considerable 
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literature on managerial-shareholder conflict in the United States.3
Managers of fully stockholder-controlled firms could not readily seek such 
rules initially, as their controlling shareholders would be unhappy with such 
managerial lobbying. But once ownership became diffuse, perhaps because of the 
combined impact of American populism and the interests of small-town bankers in 
the nineteenth century, managers could more readily engage in such political 
action, free from shareholder veto. 
 The literature 
on the spillover of managerial preferences and authority into the political sphere is 
thinner, although efforts can be found in Roe (1990, 1993), Grundfest (1990), and 
Bebchuk & Neeman (2010).  
3. Controlling shareholders vs. capital markets. Controlling shareholders 
have reason to maintain rules that allow them to shift value to themselves. 
Corporate rules affect the private benefits of control — such as the ease with which 
small shareholders can reverse related-party transactions between the firm and the 
controlling insiders, and the ease by which controlling shareholders can squeeze 
out minority stockholders at an unfair price. Once a player controls a public firm, it 
has an interest in maintaining (or expanding) its capacity to shift value to itself.4 
This feature seems to have been important in several western European nations in 
recent decades.5
 
 
III. CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD 
 
A. Rudiments without Government Institutions 
 
Development authorities often focus on bolstering institutions that promote 
financial markets, in the belief that better financial markets will lead to economic 
development. They seek to develop superior corporate laws, better securities laws, 
and better courts and other institutions to enforce financial and other contracts. 
These efforts are appropriate, but the initial conditions needed historically for 
financial markets have been simple, with political economy conditions central. If 
the developing nation is sufficiently stable politically and socially, the first steps 
for financial markets institutions can be taken, and often have been taken, with 
limited government action. Thereafter, as the financial markets develop, there will 
be interests that seek to institutionalize that development and push it to the next 
level — and who have the know-how to do so. 
This sequence — first social and political stability, then financial market 
development, and then legal consolidation later — is illustrated in studies of the 
initial development of the planet’s strongest securities markets. They all show a 
rather weak corporate institutional environment initially, but one embedded in a 
sufficiently stable environment so that reputational forces could propel initial, 
extra-legal financial market development. Related concepts of repeated games, 
                                                          
3 E.g., Berle & Means (1933), Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
4 Bebchuk & Roe (1999). 
5 Morck, ed. (2000) (concentrated ownership). 
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with expectations of long time lines for the repeating, as generating mild but real 
institutional self-enforcement, are relevant here.6
Consider Bradford DeLong’s (1991) famous piece on Morgan’s directors. In 
an environment of weak corporate law, see Rock (2001), the Morgan firm put their 
partners on firms’ boards, in order to offer their own reputation to protect 
shareholders from scurrilous or incompetent management. (And, it must be added, 
perhaps facilitating cartelization, through the Morgan partners sitting on boards of 
competitors.) Pernicious insider dealings, or undiscovered managerial 
incompetence, would cost the Morgan firm dearly, so they warranted (albeit 
weakly) that such nefarious or incompetent results would be unlikely to occur in 
the firms on whose boards they sat. Outside investors might not trust the firm, but 
they had more reason to trust the Morgan directors. Other investment banking 
firms presumably acted similarly. 
  
Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) find an analogous reputational market at work 
in the nascent Japanese stock market of post-Meiji Restoration, late nineteenth 
century Japan. Firms sought directors with sterling reputations, to warrant to 
smaller stockholders that the firm had, and would continue to have, adequately fair 
and satisfactorily competent management. The reputational directors had a lot to 
lose socially and perhaps psychologically, so they cared what happened inside the 
firm. Franks, Mayer & Rossi (2009) and Mayer (2008) demonstrate a similar 
process at work in Britain at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Reputations and repeat dealings supported a nascent stock market. Hard-
edged, government-facilitated legal institutions came later. 
The point here is not that reputational structures are a panacea, obviating the 
need to build supportive institutions. Rather, the point is two-fold: a financial 
market can start developing without preexisting strong institutional support, but it 
needs a stable political and social environment that makes the reputational markets 
valuable (and possible) to build. Once a rudimentary capital market is in place, a 
constituency in the nation that would support more rigorous institutions to regulate 
and promote capital markets begins developing. 
The steps toward more rigorous institutions do not need to lead immediately 
to “hard” law. Stock markets’ enforcement, for example, can initially be built, 
again albeit weakly, by the financial players. They can punish miscreants by 
exclusion (such as by de-listing in stock market terms or breaking the miscreants’ 
trading bench at medieval trading fairs, points made, respectively, by Mahoney 
(1997) and North and Weingast (1989)). 
These private, exclusionary mechanisms were important in the development 
of American stock markets.7
                                                          
6 Greif (2006: ch. 3 and 441-43), cf. Scott (1987). 
 But such private ordering is imperfect, as the 
punishments the private players can invoke — typically exclusion or a besmirched 
reputation — cannot reach the severity that public punishments can, via criminal 
penalties and fines. Still, the point persists that some sanctions can start before the 
public authorities act, as long as the political and social setting is sufficiently 
stable. 
7 Mahoney (1997), Coffee (2001), Roe (2001). 
Capital Markets and Financial Politics 
 
10 
 
Presumably such private ordering mechanisms could come forth and be 
effective in other nations, including developing nations today. But for many 
nations without sufficient political stability, such reputational and private ordering 
institutions are difficult or impossible to start up. Hence, those seeking to promote 
capital markets should have reason to inquire into the sources of political stability, 
a subject I examine below. 
 
B. Elites’ Interests 
 
A nation’s elites may have little interest in promoting financial markets. 
Two self-interested reasons could be in play. First, the elites may have satisfactory 
access to capital through, say, family banks or informal channels. Their grip on the 
polity may also allow them to stifle entry into banking, thereby keeping capital in 
the channels they already control. But a widespread, deep capital market could 
challenge the elite’s monopoly status by facilitating upstart competitors’ access to 
capital and, hence, increasing the upstarts’ capacity to compete with the elites.   
Rajan and Zingales (2003a) analyze this channel in several contexts, of both 
developing and developed nations, and show how trade openness affects a nation’s 
elites’ calculations. If the nation is open to trade, then the elites’ underlying 
businesses must compete, simultaneously making efficient allocation of capital 
vitally important to them and making any suppression of competition with local 
upstarts less valuable (because international, cross-border competition will be 
intense anyway). Thus, Rajan and Zingales (2003b) conclude, in open-trade 
countries, elites would be less likely to oppose capital market development. Elites 
in closed countries would have greater incentives to suppress capital market 
development. 
For developing nations, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001), Engerman 
& Sokoloff (2002, 2005), and Engerman, Haber & Sokoloff (2000) each indicate 
how land and agricultural conditions, settlement conditions, and factor 
endowments could affect early colonial structures so as to strengthen (or weaken) 
elites with repressive interests and capacities. Particularly where settlement 
conditions were difficult due to terrain or climate, or where plantation-style 
agriculture was most efficient, colonial conditions induced powerful, concentrated 
elites who had little need for either broad-based property rights or open 
opportunity societies. Those original conditions persist or they induced equality-
impeding institutions that persist to today. In other colonial settings, particularly 
where land, climate, and agriculture made European settlement easy and favored 
smaller, more widely-distributed and often individually-owned farms, colonization 
induced broad-based property rights, with weaker elites. These contrasting original 
settlement conditions then set the stage for equality-enhancing or equality-
impeding institutions, which in turn affected property rights and financial markets 
over the long run. Analyses of the same general genre can be found in Boix (2003: 
45-46, 93) and Rodrik (1999). Cf. Olson (1984). 
For Russia, Sonin (2003) and Hoff & Stiglitz (2008) evaluate the political 
economy of the elites — there, the “oligarchs” — analogously. Property protection 
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can be provided privately or publicly. The oligarchs were well-positioned to 
protect their property from other less powerful private players. Yet, they judged 
that publicly-provided property protection would facilitate competition from the 
less powerful, because the already-powerful can protect themselves adequately 
anyway, so they opposed stronger property rights. Hence, financial markets did not 
develop. (The oligarchs’ opposition to stronger property rights, and the 
concomitant financial market development may have been short-sighted: the 
private, elite oligarchs were advantaged in property protection vis-à-vis less well-
placed private actors, but they did less well when pitted against emboldened public 
players when Putin came to power. Had stronger property protection and financial 
market depth been in place when the stronger state emerged, the government might 
have had more difficulty in suppressing the oligarchs in as many dimensions as it 
did.)  
This elite suppression of competition explanation is important, although 
incomplete, because the elites that can shut down local financial markets can 
presumably also shut down open border trading markets.  The explanation works 
well when trade barriers decline for an exogenous reason, such as European 
political goals of fostering a continent-wide economy in recent decades, in ways 
that overrode local interests.  
Moreover, in a democracy, one must explain why the democratic polity 
accedes to the elites’ interests. A plausible starting point is that the elites’ interests 
coincide with those of others, making a politically-dominant coalition possible. A 
common example is that labor in the elites’ industries also have reason to stifle 
product competition. The two may ally, with labor providing the democratic voting 
muscle, as Roe (2001, 2003) indicates. Consideration of more complex coalitions 
comes below. Here let us observe that movement to democracy, all else equal, 
should foster deeper capital markets, as elites have less weight in the nation’s 
decision-making and, hence, their goal of suppressing competitive upstarts will be 
harder to attain. However, all else will not be equal when an oligarchy becomes a 
democracy, as the elites would be pressed then to form coalitions with broader 
voting groups, like labor. Corporatism and varieties of capitalism concepts may 
have contained this kind of coalition of elites with similarly-interested non-elites 
embedded in the conceptualization. 
 
C. Non-Elites’ Interests 
 
Non-elites in developing nations can affect property protection and capital 
markets. If they are living a subsistence life, then appropriating capital can make 
their lives much better in the short run. If they have weak prospects or are currently 
calorie-challenged, their immediate survival considerations should trump long-run 
development goals. Their long-run may be capital markets’ short run.  
And the converse problem of the haves seeking to suppress the rise of new 
competitors can occur. The have-nots can see property rights, such as investor 
protection, as protecting the haves. They could conclude that weaker investor 
Capital Markets and Financial Politics 
 
12 
 
protection would enable them to become the equivalent of squatters on the elites’ 
financial assets. 
These two dimensions could lead to complex calculations of self-interest: 
elites may want protection against financial squatters, but their offsetting desire to 
suppress new competition may weaken their interest in greater property protection. 
The have-nots may want to protect their meager property, and a few of the 
upwardly mobile may think they could enter the elite. But most conclude that 
investor protection protects the elites’ capital from the have-nots’ incursions. So 
they oppose strong property rights for capital. 
 
D. Political Stability 
 
Roe and Siegel (2010) advance a complementary idea — that financial 
markets cannot develop easily in severely unstable political environments. As 
Huntington (1968: 8) observes, “[a]uthority has to exist before it can be limited, 
and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where 
government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals [and] rambunctious 
colonels….” Roe and Siegel find that political instability robustly explains 
differing levels of financial development, even after controlling for trade openness 
and the level of economic development — and does so in both country-fixed-
effects and instrumental variable regressions, and across multiple measures of 
instability and financial development. In an unstable society, investors’ basic 
property rights cannot be secure, because they cannot be sure what the polity will 
look like over the life of their investments.  
Moreover, a political economy literature plants instability’s roots in 
inequality-perpetuating institutions and ethnic fractionalization.8
 
 The first factor, 
economic inequality, fits tightly with explaining why investor protection doesn’t 
develop in unstable environments: For the unstable polity to protect investors, it 
would have to protect the most favored elements in that polity. Yet that unstable 
polity is riven by contention over the division of wealth and income — i.e., 
whether the favored can keep their wealth. They use proxies for inequality-
perpetuating institutions and social fractionalization of the type that Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2002) brought forward and that Easterly (2007) validated, as further 
evidence for the old idea that inequality induces instability. A developing nation 
needs to break the negative causal chain of inequality-to-instability-to-weak-
financial-development in order to position itself to develop its capital market. 
E. Inequality 
 
It bears separate emphasis that inequality is at the base of several of these 
theories. Severe inequality undermines political stability, but that political stability 
is foundational for financial market development privately and then publicly. Yet it 
may not be easy to reduce that inequality, not just for the obvious reason that those 
                                                          
8 E.g., Alesina & Perotti (1996), cf. Ayyagari et al. (2008). 
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who lose from reducing inequality do not always support its reduction. Inequality 
may be due to the production technologies available in the economy; it may be 
endogenous to the polity itself. 
Yet several of the world’s most developed financial markets are in nations, 
like the United States, that have quite high Gini coefficients for the distribution of 
wealth and property. This characteristic deserves further inquiry.  
1. Original conditions. Path dependence could explain this outcome. The 
nation’s income and wealth distribution may have been substantially equal when 
financial markets first developed and then the nation accepted the inequality later. 
For the United States, this path dependence result is plausible, as American income 
and property distribution until the end of the nineteenth century was relatively 
flat.9
A similar sequential process holds true for England. England was the locus 
of the first industrial revolution. Its severe labor shortage at the time and its energy 
abundance have been noted as foundations for the technological developments of 
the first industrial revolution.
 Financial markets started to develop during that era and, without a major 
political break, persisted. Preferences were not always pro-capital-market, but they 
sought to channel that market, not destroy it. Conversely, in countries that suffered 
a major political break, the distribution of income and wealth during the period in 
which the capital market was reconstructed could have profoundly influenced its 
subsequent shape. 
10
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002: 44-46, 63-83), as noted previously, offer a 
general structure of the political economy of property rights in the developing 
world, in which we can place rights in the capital market as a subset. If a 
colonizing power came to land areas best used for plantation-style crops or, say, 
mining activities using much unskilled labor, then the original political institutions 
would reflect the underlying land use characteristics. The colonists from the 
colonizing country had little reason to foster broad-based property rights, as they 
could protect themselves well enough. They had little reason to foster developing 
broad-based education and skills for their plantation workers, since the elites only 
needed unskilled labor.
 Less well-noted is that the higher wage rate that 
accompanies scarce labor would also mitigate inequality, thereby reducing 
potential political instability and, hence, giving capital market development an 
opening.  
11 The consequence is that the nation early on, while still a 
colony, lacked widely-distributed property and had weak property protection 
institutions. Oppressive institutions persisted and capital markets had little role in 
future development.12
2. Conceptualizing economic inequality. A second characteristic is related 
but not identical. Politically-destabilizing inequality may not be a function of the 
raw ratio of wealth and income of the richest to that of the poorest. Rather it might 
 
                                                          
9 Lindert (2006: 2-624). 
10 Allen (2009). 
11 Cf. Bobonis (2008). 
12 See also Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) and Engerman, Haber & Sokoloff (2000). 
Cf. Glaeser (2006).  
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be based on something more complex, which we can call a severity ratio.  That is, 
we look at how close the poorest are to being unable to obtain (say) their 2000 
calories per day. That is the denominator. The numerator is the excess (above 2000 
calories per day) of the richest in that nation.13
 In these terms, unlike in the conventional Gini concept, the United States is 
not all that severely unequal — even the bottom fifth can usually get their 2000 
calories per day, unlike in other nations with sharp income inequality. In another 
polity, where the bottom fifth struggles to obtain only 1800 calories per day, the 
reconceptualized severity ratio could be quite high, even though the usual Gini 
calculation would consider the nation to be more equal than the United States. 
  
3. Mapping inequality and equality onto race. Race, ethnicity, and religion 
can be central in a polity, particularly when wealth and income disparities cleave 
along racial or ethnic lines. If race and class map onto one another, that can make it 
easier for groups to demonize and dehumanize opposing groups and make a stable 
polity harder to achieve. Several studies have found such ethnic conflicts to be 
central to political instability.14
Race and ethnicity can have other effects, a result that makes analysis of 
their impact difficult. They can make it easier for capital markets to flourish by 
diverting conflict from economic to non-economic issues, thereby pushing conflict 
between haves and have-nots lower on the political agenda. If the polity cleaves 
along cultural or multiple identity lines that do not map onto distributional 
differences, those distributional differences can recede in political contentiousness. 
Dahl (1971), Benson (1961), Sombart (1906), and Schattsneider (1960) speak to 
this kind of issue in varying ways. 
 
The distinction seems to be whether class and property-owning fault lines 
are also race and ethnicity lines. If yes, capital-market-debilitating conflict would 
seem likely to be enhanced; if not, then the polity may turn from economic conflict 
that could damage financial markets to social conflict. 
 
IV. CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
 
In this Part, I expand upon several of these classifications, with an eye on 
political economy configurations around the developed world in recent decades. 
 
A. Contemporary 
 
1. Labor in Europe. After World War II, labor was particularly powerful in 
Europe, in ways that profoundly affected capital markets development. Capital 
markets institutions were poorly supported in terms of budgets and personnel for 
the capital markets’ regulatory apparatus.15
                                                          
13 Williamson (2009). 
 With labor able to make strong claims 
on firms’ cash flows, owners had more reason to stay in place and run the firm, or 
14 See Alesina et al. (2003); Easterly & Levine (1997). 
15 Jackson & Roe (2009). 
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keep a close watch on the managers, to have more of that cash directed to owners 
than to workers than weakly-monitored managers in capital markets would tend to 
direct. In the weakened international trading markets after the war, labor and 
owners had reason to unite to preserve their market position, keep out competition, 
and divide the spoils.16
2. Managers in the United States. Managers in the United States are a 
powerful interest group in making the rules governing corporate finance and 
capital markets. In the 1980s, for example, capital markets created the hostile 
takeover, which aggregated enough stock such that an outside firm or entrepreneur 
could acquire an established firm that had a diffusely-owned stock structure. (As is 
well-known, that diffuse ownership facilitated the growth of managerial agency 
costs, because managers lacked a day-to-day boss.) 
 
In reaction to this agency-cost structure, outside firms and entrepreneurs 
would offer to buy up a target firm’s stock, with a view to changing management 
policy or changing management itself. Yet managers were able to disrupt those 
hostile takeovers transactionally and politically. Transactionally, firms developed 
poison pills and staggered boards that made it costly for the outsider to buy up the 
target company’s stock. Politically, managers, through their lobbying organizations 
such as Chambers of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and, yes, the American 
Bar Association, obtained favorable laws through the political process — laws that 
validated and often added to these disruptions of the hostile takeover. 
 
B. Historical 
 
1. American populism. Populism can affect financial markets and 
institutions. Andrew Jackson’s destruction in the 1830s of the Second Bank of the 
United States is the most famous example in American history. It was a seminal 
event in American financial political history, leaving the United States without a 
truly national banking system until the latter part of the twentieth century. The 
effect was to make securities markets more vital for the United States and to deny 
the United States even the rudiments of a central bank until the beginning of the 
twentieth century (or perhaps not until 1935). American capital markets could not 
develop via a nationwide banking system in the nineteenth and most of the 
twentieth centuries. Roe (1994) attributes a significant fraction of American 
differences from the rest of the world to the aftermath of Jackson’s veto and the 
institutions developed to accommodate the resulting weak national banking 
system. 
It could have gone the other way, as two early American Congresses and 
two American presidents chartered the first and second banks, making the decision 
to have a quasi-central bank a closer one than basic history books usually have it. 
Happenstance of political maneuvering was relevant, as an ambitious Henry Clay 
thought that early passage of a re-chartering would put Jackson on the defensive, 
forcing him to approve it, while at the same time the incumbent head of the Second 
Bank of the United States, Nicholas Biddle, proved to be politically clumsy. Yet 
                                                          
16 Roe (2000, 2001, 2003). 
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Clay underestimated both Jackson’s resolve and the influence of smaller, weaker 
banks that preferred not to be challenged by the Second Bank’s regulatory 
impulses. Jackson’s veto and destruction of the Second Bank left the United States 
without a strong, national banking system. 
Political economy and populist political impulses persisted, and institutions 
created by earlier preferences had staying power. After Jackson’s 1830s 
destruction of the Bank, there were multiple efforts to facilitate a truly national 
banking system. However, these failed on the twin shoals of smaller banks’ 
influence in Congress and populist opinion that did not want a truly national 
banking system.  
During the Civil War, for example, the United States built institutions that 
were called national banks and that substantively received their charter from 
Washington. But these banks were not national in their operation, as they were 
permitted to operate from only a single physical location. This limit was 
challenged in the 1890s, as the Treasury proposed to allow nation-wide branching, 
but the challenge failed in Congress. It was challenged again in the 1920s and 
1930s, but it was only mildly tweaked: branching of banks was still limited to a 
single state at most and, for many states, a smaller geographic profile. 
Popular animus played a role in major banking and insurance legislation 
historically. Glass-Steagall’s separation of investment and commercial banking, 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956’s limits on bank activities (recall, for 
those familiar with the politicians of the time, Wright Patman’s influence), and the 
major life insurance companies’ lack of power to own common stock (due to the 
Armstrong investigation of 1906) all can be traced in major part to this popular 
animus. This left the United States with severe limits on national financial 
operations: a lack of a national banking system, banks without power to engage in 
commerce, and insurance companies without authority to own common stock. 
Although other nations have had some of these limits, few have had them all. 
Britain, for example, has had powerful insurers. Germany has had universal banks 
with substantial stock ownership and even more powerful control of their 
customers’ votes. Japan has had nation-spanning banks with significant stock 
ownership. 
2. German codetermination. German codetermination is a formal institution 
reflecting this shareholder–social democratic balance of power, vividly illustrating 
the political economy effects on core corporate institutions. To settle raw political 
conflict at several moments in the twentieth century, German social democracy led 
to laws mandating that labor be represented in firms’ boardrooms, culminating in 
approximately parity representation for labor in 1976 for the nation’s largest firms. 
Since unconstrained managers’ agendas for continuance, size, and risk avoidance, 
see Jensen (1986), maps onto employees’ own agendas for the same, an implicit, 
albeit rough, coalition can easily form between managers and employees. 
Shareholders will want to have a cohesive counter-coalition in the boardroom. 
Concentrated ownership is a primary way to concretize that counter-coalition. 
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V. PREFERENCE AGGREGATION AND COMBINATORICS 
 
Thus far we have generally examined discrete interests and their preferences 
for and against various capital markets forms. Here in this Part, I examine, first, 
how coalitions can form, persist, and morph. Second, I examine the political 
institutions of preference aggregation and how they affect the political economy 
outcomes that in turn affect capital market results. 
 
A. Shifting Coalitions 
 
No one group may dominate the polity’s capital market decisions. Coalitions 
may affect who wins and who loses, and  capital markets’ configuration. 
1. Banks and labor in Europe. One of the more interesting instances of the 
formation of a capital-market-affecting coalition can be seen in post–World War II 
Western Europe. Perotti and von Thadden (2006) provide compelling 
argumentation and significant data to support the idea that western European 
polities in the post–World War II era had the equivalent of a banker-labor coalition 
that impeded capital market development.  
The argument begins with the median voter theorem: in post-World War II 
western Europe, they posit that the median voter had strong human capital but little 
financial capital. As such, the median voter had little interest in promoting 
financial markets that could readily erode their human capital. Capital markets that 
demand the immediate imposition of new technologies as soon as they are 
available could readily erode the value of human capital skills tied to the old 
technologies. And, lacking much financial cushion, most voters were also very risk 
averse. 
At the same time, banks — to the extent their creditors’ interest dominated 
their other financial interests — were moderately risk averse (because the 
downside disproportionately affected their loans, while the upside benefited 
stockholders). Accordingly, banks that became primary corporate governance 
players had a risk-averse profile that fit well with the median voter’s preferences. 
Labor with limited capital preferred banks to stock markets — and that is what 
they got. The median voter voted for bank-oriented capitalism.17
Moreover, if a decisive, median-voter middle class had seen its savings and 
wealth destroyed by the interwar inflation, it would plausibly put a premium on 
pension obligations guaranteed by the government. Then, as the government 
became the principal provider of pension and retirement funding, private pension 
funds, a major conduit for capital in the United States, would play a smaller role in 
that economy.
   
18
One potential difficulty with this perspective is that the median voter in 
many nations lacks much financial capital, even in polities with stronger capital 
 
                                                          
17 Or, analogously, their political parties made appropriate deals to support bank-oriented 
capitalism. Pagano & Volpin (2005). 
18 See Perotti & Schwienbacher (2009). 
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markets. But it’s plausible to recast the thesis in political coalition terms that I may 
later develop more deeply: In post–World War II Western Europe, labor was 
powerful, partly because much physical capital had been destroyed during the war 
(see below), despite that labor did not often provide the median voter. But in 
coalition with some savers, or with the banks themselves, labor and these capital 
interests could determine the political economy outcome for capital markets.19
2. Managers and populism. American managers indirectly benefited from 
American populism. A plausible view of the sequential development of American 
capital markets history is the following. In the 1890s, national enterprises became 
viable: railroads spanned the American continent, making the nation into a single 
market, and engineering economies of scale made large-scale production especially 
valuable. With American populism having facilitated a weak national banking 
system, mergers in that decade needed stock market financing. With stock market 
financing in place, ownership started separating from control. Once ownership 
separated from control, managers could become political actors in their own right, 
via their lobbying organizations such as the Business Roundtable, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and Chambers of Commerce. Their interest was to 
preserve and enhance managerial authority, which they have accomplished. 
 
3. Managers and labor in the United States. A similar American coalition 
could be found in the 1980s. Hostile takeovers made managers’ lives considerably 
more difficult during that decade, as is well known. But they also disrupted 
workers’ expectations in the firm, by putting their jobs at risk. Even if workers 
would not be left unemployed, they would find themselves in a disrupted work 
environment. Thus they opposed hostile takeovers.  
The combination of managers and labor could be decisive in making for 
state anti-takeover law. When a Pennsylvania corporation was targeted for a hostile 
takeover, it sought strong antitakeover law from the Pennsylvania legislature. For 
many Pennsylvania legislators, voting for the legislation was easy, as both the 
Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO supported the legislation. Roe (1993: 
339), quotes a contemporary comment: 
 
[The] lobbying effort is the product of teamwork between … Pennsylvania labor 
unions and a coalition of over two dozen corporations working for the passage of the 
bill under the well-organized direction of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and 
Industry. 
 
Constituency statutes, which allowed boards to consider labor interests 
when deciding whether to support or oppose a takeover, are a manifestation of this 
coalition. 
4. Dominant stockholders and labor. Dominant stockholders could ally with 
labor. As we’ve seen, business elites often have an interest in suppressing financial 
                                                          
19 It’s also possible to recast the argument in property-owning terms. The relevant question 
would be whether the median voter owns property, not simply whether he or she owns financial 
property. If the median voter owns significant property — a house, a car — then he or she may 
support property rights generally, which include rights to financial property. 
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markets, as upstarts need access to capital and, without strong financial markets, 
upstarts cannot get the capital to compete with incumbent elites. But this then begs 
the question of why, in a democracy, the polity would accede to the elites’ 
interests. 
Mistake is one possibility. Ideology is another. A coalition is a third: labor at 
the incumbent firms may get a slice of what would otherwise go to the incumbents, 
motivating labor at the business elites’ firms to support the elites’ interests because 
they coincide with their own. If labor obtains such a rent, it wants to suppress 
product market competition with their employer, suppress upstarts’ access to new 
finance, and suppress open trade with foreign competitors — trade that would 
erode both labor’s rents and those of the elite.  
*  *  * 
A sophisticated rendition of the multiple possible coalitions can be found in 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), who show how there are almost as many 
permutations as there are rich nations are in play. Labor power can dominate 
owners and managers, as in Sweden. Or owners and managers can coalesce to 
dominate workers, as in Korea. Or owners can dominate both, as in oligarchic 
nations. Or workers and owners can coalesce to dominate managers. Or workers 
and managers can dominate owners, as in corporatist states, such as Germany, 
Japan, and the Netherlands. 
 
B. Political Institutions and Preference Aggregation 
 
Particularly since Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, political scientists have 
examined mechanisms of preference aggregation in a polity, as these profoundly 
affect policy outcomes. As is well known, the impossibility theorem’s conceptual 
power comes from voters having differently ordered preferences.  When a choice 
between two of those options is presented, the voting result may differ from that 
which would result if the ordering of the choices had been otherwise.  
1. Parliamentary vs. presidential systems: proportional representation and 
party-lists. Pagano & Volpin (2005) adapt Persson & Tabellini’s (2000, 2005) 
general inquiry into parliamentary systems, proportional representation, and 
presidential systems to corporate and capital markets. Party-list, proportional 
representation will enable a coalition among business owners and labor to enact 
rules that poorly protect capital providers (so that incumbent business owners 
benefit at the expense of outside investors) and that protect incumbent labor well. 
Decisions are not driven by the median voter, but by the way a dominant coalition 
is formed. Iversen & Soskice (2006) argue that proportional representation 
structures facilitate center-left redistributive coalitions, while majoritarian, 
presidential, first-past-the-post systems facilitate center-right, low redistribution 
outcomes. In majoritarian systems, they indicate, the decisive middle class vote 
will side with the well-to-do for fear of being taxed by the poor; but in proportional 
representation systems, the middle class can ally with the poor to redistribute from 
the well-to-do while still maintaining enough influence in the middle-poor 
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coalition to ensure that the middle-class are not themselves the target for 
redistribution. 
Mueller (2006) shows further how first-past-the-post electoral systems, such 
as those in the United States, can affect corporate governance outcomes. In such 
political systems, a national interest group, such as labor, needs to persistently 
renew its capture of a working majority in the legislature, working district-by-
district, legislator-by-legislator. But in a party-list system, the identity of the 
particular legislator is not vital to the interest group getting that legislator’s vote: 
the legislator follows party discipline, thereby facilitating national deal-making in 
which national labor institutions could be quite influential. In systems with first-
past-the-post territorial elections, such as the United States, such national 
coalitions (and their concomitant influence) are harder to create and maintain. It’s 
thus no accident that Tip O’Neill’s famous aphorism — that all politics is local — 
came from an American national politician, the locally-elected leader of the House 
of Representatives, a legislative body that is a collection of locally-elected 
representatives who make national policy. 
Mechanisms for preference aggregation can have a profound impact on the 
ability of players to form coalitions and, consequently, on the influence they can 
exert on the development of capital markets.  
2. American federalism: I. The organization of the American Congress is 
relevant here in another dimension as well. If all politics (in the United States) is 
local, local interests can determine national outcomes. One reason why all politics 
is local is the organization of the House of Representatives by districts. With 
representatives dependent on local interests for their election, the House was 
responsive historically to local bankers who wished to be shielded from out-of-
district competition. When technology was such that localized bricks-and-mortar 
banking was possible (i.e., before the era of automated teller machines), bankers 
presumably had the means and the motivation to influence on their local 
representatives’ voting on whether to facilitate nationwide bank branching, a result 
that we’ve seen deeply affected American capital markets. The state-by-state 
organization of the Senate presumably could have had a similar, albeit weaker, 
impact. 
Hence, one can see a structure-driven process: American political structure 
promoted local interests. When local banking was technologically possible, this 
local power overly emphasized local banking, making national banking markets 
impossible during the formative years of national industry. This meant large 
industrial firms had to raise their capital from disparate sources, facilitating a shift 
in authority inside the firm to managers. 
3. American federalism: II, Delaware.  American corporate and capital 
markets law is made in two principal jurisdictions: Delaware (via the law of 
corporate organization) and Washington (via the law covering securities 
regulation).  
The federal organization of American corporate lawmaking has long been a 
focus of American corporate law academics, who have seen competition among 
states for corporate charters (and their resulting revenues) as a core driver in 
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making corporate law, thereby applying Tiebout’s (1956) insights on political 
jurisdictional mobility to the specifics of corporate lawmaking. Some thought the 
competition was “to the top” in making corporate law more efficient20 while others 
saw the competition as one to the bottom, by favoring the corporate players most 
central to the incorporation decision — managers, controlling shareholders, and 
their lawyers.21
Unlike other polities, the United States effectively allows the corporation to 
choose its own state of incorporation, regardless of where it does business in the 
United States; the corporation thus chooses its own governing law. (European 
integration may induce a similar structure, as recent EU Court of Justice decisions 
have facilitated corporations using the corporate law of a nation that is not its main 
place of business.) 
 
Federal organization of the polity can affect capital markets. During the 
hostile takeover era, many states passed strong anti-takeover laws, making it 
transactionally more expensive for an outsider to buy up stock of a public firm. In 
the political balance were the following: Local managers did not want the hostile 
takeover to proceed. Local labor employed by the target company did not want the 
offer to proceed. While shareholders in the capital market presumably wanted the 
takeover to proceed, many of them were not local, because capital markets were 
national, or international. Hence, the balance favored in-state managerial and labor 
interests over capital market interests.22
4. American federalism: III, Delaware and Washington. The simultaneous 
state-federal structure of American corporate lawmaking can affect capital markets 
in another dimension, particularly if Delaware has room to maneuver, i.e., as long 
as state-to-state competition is not tightly binding. The interests that dominate in 
Delaware are not the same as those making corporate and securities law in 
Washington. Particularly during times of financial crisis or scandal, the populist 
input to weaken shareholder and financial strength in the corporation, or to punish 
managers who are seen as overly-compensated, is strong in Washington. That kind 
of input is weaker in Delaware, where the interests of managers and shareholders 
dominate, nearly to the exclusion of other interests and forces. 
 Again, all politics is local. 
In areas that are of overlapping concern to national and Delaware 
lawmakers, the national and local polities interact in two major ways. First, 
Delaware may preemptively pass financial and corporate law that it might not have 
passed otherwise, to reduce the chances of federal intervention. It may do so out of 
self-preservation:  If Delaware is way out of line with national sentiment, corporate 
law could move to Washington, which could replace Delaware lawmaking with 
national lawmaking, turning corporate law, like securities law, into national, 
congressionally-made law. Second, it may do so to protect its local interests: with 
first-mover advantages, Delaware may pass rules that go some but not all of the 
way to satisfying the national appetite. Doing so would allow it to preserve as 
                                                          
20 Romano (1993), Winter (1977). 
21 Cary (1974), Bebchuk (1992). Kahan & Kamar (2002) question how intense that state 
competition really is.  
22 E.g., Romano (1988), Roe (1993), Miller (1998). 
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much autonomy for managers (or value for shareholders) as possible, by 
persuading the national player that enough had been done, so that the national 
players need not act. This is analogous to the process Spiller and Gely (2008) 
posited for the Supreme Court, by which the Court often decides in ways to 
diminish the chance of congressional action (by coming closer to congressional 
preferences than they would have otherwise), a process that Roe (2005) analyzed 
for Delaware-Washington interaction. 
5. Corporatism and varieties of capitalism. Western European nations have 
been analyzed as corporatist systems for some time, with analysts viewing the 
economy as being largely governed by a tripartite of decision-makers: the 
government, peak labor associations, and employer representatives. The varieties 
of capitalism literature23
6. Weak capital after World War II. Earlier in the paper, I offered the 
possibility that a defining feature of the political economy of American capital 
markets can be found in the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States, 
which left the United States without a nationwide banking system during the 
nineteenth century, when a continent-wide, nationwide industrial economy arose. 
The interests, ideologies, and institutions that resulted tended to reinforce 
themselves during times of crisis, and no crisis was so severe as to leave the 
economy flat, destroyed, and needing a fully new set of institutions. 
 integrated this thinking into production characteristics. 
That literature argues that economies that depend on skilled labor tend not to have 
liquid stock markets, which would disrupt labor skills. Conversely, economies that 
depend less on labor with firm specific skills could handle capital markets’ 
disruptions. While not exactly formal preference aggregation, these analyses do 
look at the informal institutions of coalition formation. Business leaders would 
want to be represented at the centralized decision-making institutions, thereby 
putting a thumb on the scale for close ownership and weaker capital markets as 
well. 
Could there be a similar foundational political economy event for Western 
European and East Asian capital markets? I think there is, but as of now the 
possibility must be seen as a hypothesis, needing both theoretical and factual 
development. 
The concept would be that after World War II enough political and 
economic institutions had been destroyed that a substantial new construction of 
those institutions took place. In those years, capital owners and labor interests 
sought to establish the rules of the game going forward from that time.  
The twist arises from the following difficulty: We know that the rules of the 
game had a pro-labor and not a pro-capital tilt in the subsequent decades. But with 
capital scarce after World War II — the physical capital was, after all, largely 
destroyed — and with labor, especially skilled labor, relatively more abundant, the 
bargaining process in the economic arena should have favored the scarce resource 
in terms of favored rules and returns. 
                                                          
23 Hall & Soskice (2001). 
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Yet, at least as far as the rules were concerned, the consensus is that the 
results went the other way. Labor markets, including wage rates and other benefits, 
were favored in the post–World War II decades. 
The hypothesis I advance here and that should be developed elsewhere is a 
political economy one: When the bargaining for a new post-war understanding as 
to how to organize capital and labor markets, the pro–capital markets players were 
relatively weak in the political arena — weak relative both to labor at the time and 
to their more usual strength in influencing results. Their physical capital had 
largely been destroyed during the war; they had limited capacity to affect the 
politics of the time with campaign contributions, with lobbying, or otherwise when 
the foundational deals were made. Only later could they afford the time, money, 
and personnel for such efforts; then they made sure that they were represented at 
the peak bargaining of the corporatist model. By that later time, however, labor had 
acquired its post-war favored status. 
 
C. Geopolitics 
 
Geography and national political power can influence internal political 
economy. Geographic features of the last half of the twentieth century are relevant 
and can be quickly sketched out. Geographic features over time are more subtle, 
but can also be seen.  
1. Countering the Soviet Union. The central geopolitical fact in Europe in 
the second half of the twentieth century was the looming presence of the Soviet 
Union. In the initial post-war elections, the communist party did quite well in 
France and Italy, making it important for centrist and conservative parties to co-opt 
the communist program, which they did. The result was policy that favored 
incumbent labor and that disfavored capital markets. 
One can think of the geopolitics as lying along a continuum: in Eastern 
Europe, communists gained power and capital markets ended. In Western Europe, 
to stave off communist power, the political center had to adopt some of the left’s 
program. For Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the relationship with China in the 
immediate post-war decades could well have brought similar domestic sensibilities 
into play. 
2. European geography over the centuries. The state has been seen as 
stronger in Europe than in the United States. This view maps onto the view of state 
actors as their own interest group that seeks to diminish the power of private 
capital markets, as outlined in the initial section of this article. The strength of the 
European state could have first originated in European geography: the open east-
west plains of Europe meant that local security from invasion was always at issue 
and that vulnerability induced national militaries and strong states. Roe (2007). 
Post-war geopolitics reproduced the incentives for a strong state. 
This geographic history would then contrast with that of the United States 
and Britain historically, and with that of Europe today. The United States and 
Britain were both separated from invaders by bodies of water — narrow but real in 
Britain’s case and wide for the United States. That geographic separation meant 
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that centralized, standing armies were not needed for national security, and the 
state could be weaker than otherwise, thereby leaving space for private capital 
markets to develop. And, today, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and a safer 
European geopolitical reality, one including European economic integration, the 
geopolitics of a centralized state for smaller European nations is historical, not 
current. 
 
D. Political Change: Rightward and Leftward Shifts over Time   
 
The left-right split’s impact on financial markets, see Perotti and von 
Thadden (2006), Roe (2003), can be tested over time, but tests done thus far are 
not dispositive. That is, financial markets in the developed nations strengthened in 
the 1990s, even in nations with locally left-of-center governments. Several 
commentators have made much of this, see Botero et al. (2004).  
This is an understandable misconception.24
Similarly, the Clinton presidency represented the American left-of-center, 
but that administration was as market-oriented as a right-tilting government in 
Western Europe in many eras.  
 The problem and its 
misconception can easily be conceptualized (and diagrammed, see Figure 2). Over 
time, the center of gravity in a polity can change, sometimes sharply: As an 
example, Tony Blair’s election as prime minister in 1997 marked not the 
ascendancy of the hard left that long dominated the Labour Party, but rather the 
ascendancy of the moderating of the left as it tacked toward the center. Yet it 
would be coded as the ascent of a left-of-center government in the usual academic 
studies thus far. But capital markets may draw comfort from a tame left and 
flourish not because the left was in power but because the left had moved 
rightward. Brazil’s experience with a market-friendly former union leader in the 
recent decade also illustrates the phenomenon and potential for a left-right 
attribution error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 See Pinto, Weymouth & Gourevitch (2010), Culpepper (2011). 
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Indeed, in a pure median voter theory, the identity of the party in power 
makes no difference: it’s the left-right location of the median voter that determines 
the polity’s policies. Since some of the most substantial empirical work done thus 
far on left-right influence on capital markets suffers from this misconception, more 
work needs to be done here. 
Eichengreen (2007: 333) explains why a left-of-center government can enact 
reforms that, in a prior decade, only a right-of-center government would have 
considered: “The German chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Agenda 2010 of labor-
market reforms was motivated, in part, by the specter of German manufacturing 
moving east if steps were not taken to reduce labor costs.” 
 And, again, preferences here seem as important as ongoing institutions in 
explaining capital markets outcomes.25
 
  
VI. INDETERMINACY, OVER-GENERALIZATION, AND LOCAL VARIATION 
 
Two characteristics can undermine the influence of the political economy 
academic agenda for understanding capital markets. First, although politics may 
well be decisive in determining capital markets’ shape and extent, too many 
                                                          
25 The rents-oriented version of the social democratic theory helps to explain Eichengreen’s 
observation. Let’s posit, again, that rents to labor and owners in key industries help to fuel the social 
democratic conventions demeaning capital markets, whose corrosive effects would erode rents to 
elites, see Rajan & Zingales (2003a), and to the favored labor sectors that induce social democratic 
governments to oppose capital market development, see Roe (2001, 2003). As the rents erode, labor 
and its allies have fewer reasons to be wary of capital market development. Hence, their preferred 
policies would change. 
Preferences and institutions interact. For example, many British corporate institutions 
developed early in the twentieth century, Franks, Mayer & Rossi (2009), when Britain was a 
conservative polity. These institutions could have persisted, even when the polity moved leftward. 
The polity might not have allowed those institutions to arise in that era, but the extant interests (and 
institutions) could have been strong enough to resist severe destruction. 
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political explanations are local: a particular coalition in this nation, the 
happenstance of deal-making in that nation. A narrative of national financial 
legislation may reveal the likely political economy story, but the explanation may 
not test well, because a testable characteristic may not repeat in a sufficient number 
of nations to run the required regressions. Consequently, only the most general of 
political economy theories may be susceptible to strong empirical analysis. 
National case studies via econometrically weak investigatory modes without 
enough data to run cross-country regressions could be how we see what explains 
capital markets depth, or lack of it. Armour and Lele (2009: 492-493) study Indian 
financial markets and investment protection in this manner, concluding with the 
primacy of political considerations: “In industries that were subject to planning, the 
dominant interest groups lobby for redistributive rules to maintain their protected 
status. By contrast, in sectors that were never subject to central planning, the 
dominant interest groups seek rules that allow markets to function more 
effectively. In short, the quality of investor protection and sectoral development 
have co-evolved on paths that have been to a large degree determined by past 
political choices.”  
A second problem afflicts a political economy approach. Often underlying 
our analysis is the goal of finding out what works for policy and recommending 
that policy’s adoption. If we can find a simple rule or two that helps capital 
markets, or can find one that hinders them without ancillary benefit, then we can 
recommend which rules should be adopted and which should not be. But a political 
economy analysis does not yield us such strong, precise normative outputs. 
National politics is hard enough to understand, much less to influence with 
academic work. 
But understanding the political economy inputs is still vital to normative 
analysis: If there’s a menu of improvements for financial markets, but some will 
run into political economy problems, while others will not, then policymakers can 
choose accordingly, picking perhaps a less good policy, but one that will be 
politically more viable. International aid agencies may be particularly susceptible 
to ignoring political economy influences because they see it as illegitimate for 
them to seek political influence. But if the earlier focus on the centrality of 
political instability is correct, they can better choose how to allocate their aid and 
advice: Highly unstable polities are unlikely to benefit from even good rules; 
attempts to graft institutions for finance into such polities will be unlikely to 
“take.” Hence, the development agencies can channel their efforts into nations that 
already have sufficient stability for success to be possible. They can also choose 
among capital markets development policies that are more likely to stabilize than 
to destabilize the polity, presumably keeping distributional outcomes in mind. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Two fundamental fractures can cripple the politics of capitalism. One is the 
contest between the haves and the have-nots. Have-nots can conclude that they 
gain too little from capitalism, so they may expropriate capital from the haves. 
Capitalism may persist in form, but its productivity would be demolished, as 
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savers will not save — i.e., will not create capital — because, in such polities, 
owners of physical and financial capital do not see their capital as safe.  Instead, 
they will consume it, for if they do not, the have-nots will consume it. 
Alternatively, the haves may capture political institutions themselves and seek to 
put in place institutions that redistribute value to themselves. In the tension, 
capitalist institutions may not survive or, if they do survive, would fail to provide 
prosperity. 
The second problem cuts the polity along another dimension: The capitalist 
haves may split and contest the polity among themselves. Those haves who have 
captured political institutions may seek to redistribute value away from other 
haves. The winners obtain rules that further their type of wealth. And with that 
enhanced wealth, they have both the strength and the motivation to preserve their 
position and to suppress competitive upstarts. If the institutions are roughly 
democratic, they will find it valuable to form alliances with voting masses, 
presumably starting with labor from their own industry. 
The political problem of capitalism is to find institutions and preference 
distributions that keep the extent of such fissures and their costs low. No country 
succeeds in making them approach zero. Much that seems superficially inefficient 
to an economics-oriented analyst is a polity’s effort to keep these fissures from 
rupturing the terrain. 
These two problems arise in multiple dimensions in the economy, affecting 
welfare and social payments, antitrust policy, taxation, corporate law, income 
distribution, and financial markets. Many seemingly smaller problems in 
implementation of rules and laws are local manifestations of one of these two 
problems. I have for the most part analyzed these two basic problems in the 
politics of capitalism in terms of how they specifically affect financial markets and 
corporate structures. The issues may be more general.  
We have made much headway in the past few decades in understanding how 
institutions persist through time. Institutions, though, are created. And institutions 
are also torn down and replaced.  People and polities with preferences and interests 
create them, change them, and at times destroy them. Sometimes previously-
created institutions can withstand a tidal wave from current preferences, sometimes 
they cannot. Sometimes preferences create new institutions that endure. Sometimes 
today’s result can be predicted from the preexisting institutional framework; 
sometimes currently-created preferences that emerge from an economic or political 
crisis determine today’s result. The political economy of capital markets well 
illustrates this interaction between preferences and institutions. Only when we 
understand how preferences for and against capital markets interact with 
institutions in the political economy will we understand the shape and extent of the 
capital market. Today’s preferences when effective and dominant in the political 
arena become tomorrow’s governing institutions.  
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